We propose a general model of monopolistic competition which encompasses existing models while being exible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. Even though preferences need not be additive and/or homothetic, the market outcome is still driven by the sole variable elasticity of substitution. We impose elementary conditions on this function to guarantee empirically relevant properties of a free-entry equilibrium. Comparative statics with respect to market size and productivity shock are characterized through necessary and sucient conditions. Furthermore, we show that the attention to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) based on its normative implications was misguided: constant mark-ups, additivity and homotheticity are neither necessary nor sucient for the market to deliver the optimum outcome. Our approach can cope with heterogeneous rms once it is recognized that the elasticity of substitution is rm-specic. Finally, we show how our set-up can be extended to cope with multiple sectors.
Introduction
In his survey of the attempts made in the 1970s and 1980s to integrate oligopolistic competition in a general equilibrium framework, Hart (1985) argued that these eorts failed to produce a consistent and workable model. The absence of a general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition unintentionally paved the way for the success of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model of monopolistic competition, developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . This model has been used in so many economic elds that a large number of scholars view it as the model of monopolistic competition. For example, Head and Mayer (2014) observe that the CES is nearly ubiquitous in the trade literature. However, owing to its extreme simplicity, this model ignores several important eects that contradict some basic ndings in economic theory. For example, unlike what the CES predicts, prices and rm sizes are aected by entry and market size, while markups vary with costs and consumer income. Recent empirical studies conducted at the rm level provide direct evidence for these ndings.
In addition, tweaking the CES or using other specic models in the hope of getting around those diculties unfortunately prevents a direct comparison between results. We realize that such a research strategy is motivated by its tractability, but it runs the risk of ignoring the fragility of the results. For example, by nesting quadratic preferences into a quasi-linear utility, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that prices depend on market size but suppress the per capita income eect. Markups depend on per capita income under the linear expenditure system in an open economy (Simonovska, 2015) , but this eect disappears in a closed economy under additive preferences (Zhelobodko et al., 2012) . Under indirectly additive preferences, there is an income eect, but market size has no impact on prices (Bertoletti and Etro, 2015) . Prices are independent of the number of competitors in the CES model of monopolistic competition, but not in oligopolistic competition (d 'Aspremont et al., 1996) . Therefore, the absence of a general framework makes it hard to deal with the implications of dierent specications of preferences.
Furthermore, Hottman et al. (2016) argue that 50 to 75% of the variance in U.S. rm size can be attributed to dierences in what these authors call rms' appeal, that is, how consumers perceive goods. As a consequence, we may safely conclude that it is time to pay more attention to the demand side in models of monopolistic competition. This is where we hope to contribute.
The elasticity of substitution is the keystone of the CES model of monopolistic competition. Although common wisdom holds that this concept is relevant only in the CES case, we show that this view is not justied a variable elasticity of substitution can be used as the primitive of a general model of monopolistic competition. What makes this approach appealing is that elasticity of substitution is a simple inverse measure of the degree of dierentiation across varieties. Our set-up also encompasses all existing models of monopolistic competition, including those with CES, quadratic, CARA, additive, and homothetic preferences. Working at this level of generality is desirable because it buys enough exibility to capture a rich array of demand and competition features. This, in turn, allows us to nd necessary and sucient conditions that the elasticity of substitution must satisfy for various comparative static eects to hold. This is useful for applied economists when discriminating among dierent specications of preferences. In addition, modelling monopolistic competition as a non-cooperative game with a continuum of players concurs with Mas-Colell (1984, 19) who states that the theory of monopolistic competition derives its theoretical importance not from being a realistic complication of the theory of perfect competition, but from being a simplied, tractable limit of oligopoly theory.
Our main ndings may be summarized as follows.
(i) Using the concept of Fréchet dierentiability, which applies to a case where the unknowns are functions rather than vectors, we determine a general demand system that includes a wide range of special cases used in the literature. In particular, for any symmetric consumption prole, the elasticity of substitution depends on just two variables, namely, the consumption level and the number of available varieties. Additive and homothetic preferences may be visualized as the horizontal and vertical axes of the plane over which the elasticity of substitution is dened.
Very much like Melitz (2003) , who highlights the implications of rm heterogeneity by using the CES, we can insulate the impact of dierent types of preferences on the market outcome when we start with symmetric rms. We rst show that, in a symmetric free-entry equilibrium, a rm's markup is equal to the inverse of the equilibrium value of the elasticity of substitution. Specically, the properties of an equilibrium depend on how the elasticity of substitution function behaves when the per-variety consumption and the number of rms vary.
By imposing plausible conditions on this function and by using simple analytical arguments, we are able to disentangle the various determinants of rms' behavior.
(ii) Our set-up is especially well suited for conducting detailed comparative static analyses in that we can determine the necessary and sucient conditions for various thought experiments undertaken in the literature. The most common experiment is studying the impact of market size on the market outcome. What market size signies is not always clear because it compounds two variables, that is, the number of consumers and their willingness to pay for the product under consideration. The impact of population size and income level on prices, output, and the number of rms need not be the same because these two parameters (population size and income level) aect demand in dierent ways. An increase in population or income raises demand, thereby fostering entry and lower prices. However an income hike also increases consumers' willingness to pay, which tends to push prices upward. The nal impact is thus a priori ambiguous.
We show that a larger market results in a lower market price and bigger rms if, and only if, the elasticity of substitution responds more to a change in the number of varieties than to a change in the per-variety consumption. This is the situation in the likely case when the entry of new rms does not make the number of varieties much more dierentiated. As for the number of varieties, this increases with the population size if varieties do not become too similar when their number increases. Thus, as in most oligopoly models, monopolistic competition exhibits the standard pro-competitive eects associated with market size and entry. An increase in individual income generates eects similar, but not identical, to a population hike if, and only if, varieties become closer substitutes when their range widens. The CES is the only utility in which price and output are independent of both income and market size. However, even with identical consumers and non-strategic rms, standard assumptions about preferences are not sucient to rule out anti-competitive eects. For this, we need additional assumptions.
Our model also allows us to study the impact of a productivity or trade liberalization shock on markups. When all rms face the same shock, we show that preferences determine the extent of the pass-through.
(iii) Ever since Chamberlin (1933) , the question of whether the market under-or overprovides diversity is one of the most studied issues in the theory of imperfect competition.
It is well known that the CES is the only additive utility for which the market achieved the optimum (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Dhingra and Morrow, 2015) . Conventional wisdom holds that the constant markup associated with CES is necessary for this result to hold. Non-CES homothetic preferences typically generate markups that vary with the number of rms. Yet we show that, for any homothetic utility, there exists a transformation of this utility that yields another homothetic utility, which diers generically from the CES, and for which the market and optimal outcomes are the same. Therefore, we may conclude that the optimality of the market equilibrium is not driven by a constant markup. What is more, we show that homotheticity is not even required for this result to hold, as we provide an example of a non-homothetic utility where the optimum is reached. Therefore, the attention that CES has received regarding its normative implications was not warranted; constant markups, additivity, or homotheticity three properties veried by the CESare neither necessary nor sucient for the market to deliver the optimum. Therefore, care is needed when the desirability of policies is assessed using monopolistic competition models based on CES preferences, as these models deliver peculiar welfare properties.
(iv) The next step is to gure out how our demand framework interacts with Melitz-like heterogeneous rms. When preferences are non-additive, the prot-maximizing strategy of a rm depends directly on the strategies chosen by all the other rms producing similar goods, which vastly increases the complexity of the problem. Despite this, we are able to show that, regardless of the distribution of marginal costs, the elasticity of substitution across varieties produced by rms which enjoy the same productivity level now depends on the number of entrants and the costs of these rms. In other words, the elasticity of substitution is now typespecic. A general model of monopolistic competition thus remains parsimonious. Furthermore, our approach paves the way to the study of asymmetric preferences in that a model with heterogeneous rms supplying symmetric varieties is isomorphic to a model with homogeneous rms selling asymmetric varieties.
(v) Last, we consider a two-sector economy. The main additional diculty stems from the fact that sector-specic expenditures depend on the upper-tier utility. Under a fairly mild assumption regarding the marginal utility, we prove the existence of an equilibrium and show that many of our results hold for a monopolistically competitive sector. All of this highlights the versatility of our model, which can be used as a building block to embed monopolistic competition in fully edged general equilibrium models coping with various economic issues.
Related literature Dierent alternatives have been proposed to avoid the main pitfalls of the CES model. Behrens and Murata (2007) In the next section, we describe the demand and supply sides of our set-up. In particular, the primitive of the model being the elasticity of substitution function, we discuss how this function may vary with the per-variety consumption and the number of varieties. In Section 3, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a free entry equilibrium and characterize its properties when rms are symmetric. Section 4 focuses on the optimality of the market outcome.
Heterogeneous rms are studied in Section 5. In Section 6, we extend our model to the case of a two-sector economy. Section 7 concludes.
The model and preliminary results
Consider an economy with L identical consumers, one sector and one production factor labor, which is used as the numéraire. Each consumer has y eciency units of labor. On the supply side, there is a continuum of rms each producing a horizontally dierentiated good under increasing returns. Each rm supplies a single variety and each variety is supplied by a single rm.
Consumers
Let N, an arbitrarily large number, be the mass of potential varieties (see (21) in Section 3 for a precise denition of arbitrarily large). As all potential varieties are not necessarily made available to consumers, we denote by N ≤ N the endogenous mass of available varieties. Since we work with a continuum of varieties, we cannot use the standard tools of calculus. Rather, we must work in a functional space whose elements are functions, and not vectors. A consumption prole x ≥ 0 is a Lebesgue-measurable mapping from the space of potential varieties [0, N] to R + . We denote by x i the consumption of variety i; for i ∈]N, N] we set x i = 0. We assume that x belongs to L 2 ([0, N]). The benet of using this space is that it is fairly straightforward to impart precise content to the assumption that the utility functional is dierentiable for Hilbert spaces (see (4) below). This space is rich enough for our purpose. For example, it embraces all consumption proles that are bounded.
To start with, we give examples of preferences used in models of monopolistic competition.
1. Additive preferences (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Kühn and Vives, 1999 ).
Preferences are additive over the set of varieties if
where u is dierentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and such that u(0) = 0. the CES, which has been used extensively in many elds and the CARA (Behrens and Murata, 2007) are special cases of (1). Bertoletti and Etro (2015) consider the case of indirectly additive preferences:
where V(p; Y ) is the indirect utility function, v is dierentiable, strictly decreasing and strictly convex, Y is consumer's income, and p i is the price for variety i. The CES is the only utility function which is both additive and indirectly additive.
2. Homothetic preferences. A tractable example of non-CES homothetic preferences used in the macroeconomic and trade literature is the translog (Bergin and Feenstra, 2009; Bilbiie et al., 2012; Feenstra and Weinstein, 2015) . There is no closed-form expression for the translog utility function. Nevertheless, by appealing to the duality principle in consumption theory, these preferences can be described by the following expenditure function:
A broad class of homothetic preferences is given by what is known as Kimball's exible aggregator, introduced by Kimball (1995) as a production function used in the macroeconomic literature (Charie et al., 2000; Smets and Wouters, 2007) . A utility functional U(x) is said to be described by Kimball's exible aggregator if there exists a strictly increasing and strictly
for any consumption bundle x. Whenever U(x) satises (2), it is single-valued, continuous, increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and linear homogeneous.
3. Quadratic preferences. An example of preferences that are neither additive nor homothetic is the quadratic utility:
where α, β,and γ are positive constants (Dixit, 1979 
In what follows, we make two assumptions about U, which seem to be close to the minimal set of requirements for our model to be nonspecic while displaying the desirable features of existing models of monopolistic competition. First, for any N , the functional U is symmetric in the sense that any Lebesgue measure-preserving mapping from [0, N ] into itself does not change the value of U. This means that renumbering varieties has no impact on the utility level.
Second, the utility function exhibits love for variety if, for any N ≤ N, a consumer strictly prefers to consume the whole range of
where X > 0 is the consumer's total consumption of the dierentiated good and I A is the indicator of A [0, N ]. Consumers exhibit love for variety if U(x) is continuous and strictly quasi-concave (see Appendix 1 in the Supplemental Material).
We also impose the condition that U has well-behaved marginal utilities in the following sense. For any given N , the utility functional U is said to be Fréchet dierentiable in x ∈
for all h ∈ L 2 , the equality
holds, ||·|| 2 being the L 2 -norm (Dunford and Schwartz, 1988 5 From now on, we focus on utility functionals that satisfy (4) for all x ≥ 0 and such that the marginal utility D(x i , x) is decreasing and twice continuously dierentiable with respect to x i ∈ R + . The function D(x i , x) (strictly) decreases with x i if U is (strictly) concave. The reason for restricting ourselves to decreasing marginal utilities is that this property allows us to work directly with well-behaved inverse demand functions.
Let p ≥ 0 be a market price prole described by a Lebesgue-measurable mapping from the space of available varieties [0, N ] to R + . We denote by p i the price of variety i. Bewley (1972) has shown that a market price prole p ≥ 0 must belong to the dual of the space of consumption proles. This condition holds here when p ∈ L 2 ([0, N]) because this space is its own dual. In this case, the total expenditure, which is given by the inner product p · x, is nite. Under (4), the rst-order conditions in L 2 ([0, N]) are similar to the corresponding conditions in a nite-dimensional space. Therefore, maximizing the utility functional U(x) subject to (i) the budget constraint
and (ii) the availability constraint
yields the following inverse demand function for variety i:
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the consumer's optimization problem. Expressing λ as a function of Y and x, we obtain
which is the marginal utility of income at the consumption prole x under income Y .
As a large share of the literature focuses on additive or homothetic preferences, it is important to provide a characterization of the corresponding demands. In the rst case, Goldman and 5 The denition of a Fréchet-dierentiable function must be changed when the marginal utility grows very fast in the neighborhood of x i = 0. We show in Appendix 2 in the Supplemental Material how to deal with this case. Uzawa (1964) show that preferences are additive i the marginal rate of substitution between varieties i and j, D(x i , x)/D(x j , x), depends only upon the consumptions x i and x j . In the second, preferences are homothetic i the marginal rate of substitution between varieties i and j depends only upon the consumption ratios x/x i and x/x j (for the proof see Appendix 3 in the Supplemental Material).
Firms: rst-and second-order conditions
Let Ω be the set of active rms. There are increasing returns at the rm level, but no scope economies which would induce a rm to produce several varieties. The continuum assumption distinguishes monopolistic competition from other market structures in that it is the formal counterpart of the basic idea that a rm's action has no impact on the others. As a result, by being negligible to the market, each rm may choose its output (or price) while accurately treating market variables as given. However, for the market to be in equilibrium, rms must accurately guess what these variables will be.
Firms share the same xed cost F and the same constant marginal cost c, so that N is bounded above by yL/F . In other words, to produce q i units of its variety, rm i needs F + cq i eciency units of labor. Hence, rm i's prot is given by
Since consumers share the same preferences, the consumption of each variety is the same across consumers. Therefore, product market clearing implies q i = Lx i . Firm i maximizes (8) with respect to its output q i while the market outcome is given by a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium distribution of rms' actions is encapsulated in x and λ. In the CES case, this comes down to treating the price-index parametrically, while under additive preferences the only payo-relevant market statistic is λ.
Plugging D (x i , x) into (8), the program of rm i is given by
, for notational simplicity, the rst-order condition for prot-maximization are given by
whereη
is the elasticity of the inverse demand for variety i. As usual, (9) may be rewritten as follows:
Since λ is endogenous, we seek necessary and sucient conditions for a unique (interior or corner) prot-maximizer to exist regardless of the value of λc > 0. The argument involves two steps.
Step 1. Consider rst the case where, for any x, the following conditions hold:
from the intermediate value theorem that (9) has at least one positive solution.
Second, (11) does not hold when D i /λ displays a nite choke price. However, it is readily veried that (9) has at least one positive solution when the choke price exceeds λc.
Step 2. The rst-order condition (9) is sucient if the prot function π i is strictly quasi-concave in x i . If the maximizer of π is positive and nite, the prot function is strictly quasi-concave in x i for any positive value of λc i the second derivative of π is negative at any solution to the rst-order condition. Since rm i treats λ parametrically, the second-order condition is given by (12) is also a necessary and sucient condition for the prot function to be strictly quasi-concave for all λc > 0, for otherwise a value of λc would exist such that the marginal revenue curve intersects the horizontal line λc more than once. Observe also that (12) means that the revenue function is strictly concave. Since the marginal cost is independent of x i , this in turn implies that π i is strictly concave in x i . When rms are quantity-setters, the prot function π i is strictly concave in x i if this function is strictly quasi-concave in x i (for the proof see Appendix 4 in the Supplemental Material). Therefore, the prot function π i is strictly quasi-concave in x i for all values of λc i (A) rm i's marginal revenue decreases in x i .
Observe that (A) is equivalent to the well-known condition obtained by Caplin and Nale-bu (1991) for a rm's prots to be quasi-concave in its own price, which is stated as follows: the Marshallian demand for variety i is (−1)-convex in p i (we show in Appendix A that the Marshallian demand is here well dened). Since the Caplin-Nalebu condition is the least stringent for a rm's prot to be quasi-concave under price-setting rms, (A) is therefore the least demanding condition when rms compete in quantities.
A sucient condition commonly used in the literature is as follows (Krugman, 1979; Vives, 1999):
(AA) the elasticity of the inverse demandη(x i , x) increases in its rst argument.
It is readily veried that (AA) is equivalent to
Since the expression (12) may be rewritten as follows:
whileη < 1 it must be that (AA) implies (A).
The elasticity of substitution
Denition The elasticity of substitution can be dened to cope with general preferences.
In what follows, we treat the elasticity of substitution as the primitive of our approach to monopolistic competition. This allows us to show how the comparative static results are driven by the demand side. To achieve our goal, we use an innite-dimensional version of the elasticity of substitution function given by Nadiri (1982, p.442) . Since x is dened up to a zero measure set, it must be that the cross-price elasticity between any two varieties is negligible:
In this case, the elasticity of substitution between varieties i and j for a given x is given bȳ
.
Hence, regardless of the structure of preferences, at any symmetric consumption pattern the elasticity of substitution depends only upon the individual consumption and the mass of varieties. In other words, the dimensionality of the problem is reduced to two variables. When rms are heterogeneous, the consumption pattern is no longer symmetric, but we will see in Section 4 how the elasticity of substitution is still applicable.
Given these, we may consider the function σ(x, N ) as the primitive of the model. There are two more reasons for making this choice. First, we will see that what matters for the properties of the symmetric equilibrium is the behavior of σ(x, N ) in x and N . More precisely, we will
show that the behavior of the market outcome can be characterized by necessary and sucient conditions stating how σ varies with x and N . Rather than using the partial derivatives of σ, it will be more convenient to work with the elasticities E x (σ) and E N (σ). Specically, the signs of these two expressions (E x (σ) ≷ 0 and E N (σ) ≶ 0) and their relationship (E x (σ) ≷ E N (σ)) will allow us to completely characterize the market outcome.
Second, since the elasticity of substitution is an inverse measure of the degree of product dierentiation across varieties, we are able to appeal to the theory of product dierentiation to choose the most plausible assumptions regarding the behavior of σ(x, N ) with respect to x and N and to check whether the resulting predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.
Remark. Our approach could be equivalently reformulated by considering the manifold (σ, E x (σ), E N (σ)), which is parameterized by the variables x and N . Being generically a twodimensional surface in R 3 , this manifold boils down to a one-dimensional locus in Mrázová and Neary (2013). The one-dimensional case encompasses a wide variety of demand systems, including those generated by additive preferences (E N (σ) = 0).
Examples
To develop more insights about the behavior of σ as a function of x and N , we give below the elasticity of substitution for the dierent types of preferences discussed above.
(i) When the utility is additive, we have:
which means that σ depends only upon the per-variety consumption when preferences are additive.
(ii) When preferences are homothetic, D(x, x) evaluated at a symmetric consumption prole depends solely on the mass N of available varieties. Setting
and using (13) yields
For example, under translog preferences, we have ϕ(N ) = 1/(1 + βN ).
Since the CES is additive, the elasticity of substitution is independent of N . Furthermore, since the CES is also homothetic, it must be that
It is, therefore, no surprise that the constant σ is the only demand parameter that drives the market outcome under CES preferences.
Using (14) and (15), it is readily veried that E N (σ) = 0 when preferences are additive, E x (σ) = 0 when preferences are homothetic, while E x (σ) = E N (σ) under indirectly additive preferences. Admittedly, making realistic assumptions on how the elasticity of substitution varies with x and N is not an easy task. That said, it is worth recalling with Stigler (1969) that it is often impossible to determine whether assumption A is more or less realistic than assumption B, except by comparing the agreement between their implications and the observable course of events. This is what we do below.
How does
Spatial and discrete choice models of product dierentiation suggest that varieties become closer substitutes when the number of competing varieties rises (Tirole, 1988; Anderson et al., 1995) . Therefore, E N (σ) ≥ 0 seems to be a reasonable assumption.
In contrast, how σ varies with x is a priori less clear. The empirical evidence strongly suggests the pass-through of a cost change triggered by a trade liberalization or productivity shock is smaller than 100 percent (De Loecker et al., 2015 ; Amiti et al., 2015) . Which assumption on σ leads to this result? The intuition is easy to grasp when preferences are additive, that is, m(x) = 1/σ(x). Incomplete pass-through amounts to saying that p/c increases when c decreases, which means that rms have more market power or, equivalently, varieties are more dierentiated. As rms facing a lower marginal cost produce more, the per capita consumption increases. Therefore, it must be that σ(x) decreases with x. In the case of general symmetric preferences, we will show below that there is incomplete pass-through i E x (σ) < 0. Because E x (σ) = 0 under homothetic preferences, the pass-through must be equal to 100%.
All of this suggests the following conditions:
Yet, the empirical evidence about the implications of entry and costs eects is not entirely conclusive. For this reason, we relax (16) by assuming that
holds for all x > 0 and N > 0. This condition is appealing because it boils down to E x (σ) ≤ 0 and E N (σ) = 0 for additive preferences, whereas E x (σ) = 0 and E N (σ) ≥ 0 for homothetic preferences. What is more, (17) is less stringent than either of these conditions. Therefore, we see it as a fairly natural condition to be satised for preferences that need not be additive or homothetic.
3 Market equilibrium 3.1 Existence and uniqueness of a symmetric free-entry equilibrium
We rst determine prices, outputs and prots when the mass of rms is xed, and then nd N by using the zero-prot condition. When N is exogenously given, the market equilibrium is given by the functionsq(N ),p(N ) andx(N ) dened on [0, N ], which satisfy the following four conditions: (i) no rm i can increase its prot by changing its output, (ii) each consumer maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint, (iii) the product market clearing condition
and (iv) the labor market balance
hold, where we have assumed that each consumer is endowed with y eciency units of labor.
The study of market equilibria where the number of rms is exogenous is to be viewed as an intermediate step toward monopolistic competition, where the number of rms is pinned down by free entry and exit.
Since we focus here on symmetric free-entry equilibria, we nd it reasonable to study symmetric market equilibria, which means that the functionsq(N ),p(N ) andx(N ) become the scalarsq(N ),p(N ) andx(N ). For this, consumers must have the same income, which holds when prots are uniformly distributed across consumers. In this case, the budget constraint (5) must be replaced by the following expression:
where the unit wage has been normalized to 1. Being negligible to the market, each rm accurately treats Y as a given.
As each rm faces the same demand, the function π(x i , x) is the same for all i. In addition, (A) implies that π(x i , x) has a unique maximizer for any x. As a result, the market equilibrium must be symmetric. Using π i ≡ (p i − c)Lx i − F , (19) boils down to the labor market balance (18) , which yields the only candidate symmetric equilibrium for the per-variety consumption:
Therefore,x(N ) is positive i the following inequality holds:
The product market clearing condition implies that the candidate equilibrium output is
Using (10) and (13) shows that there is a unique candidate equilibrium price given bȳ
Clearly, if N is so large that (21) is violated, no interior equilibrium exists. Accordingly, we have the following result: If both (A) and (21) hold, then there exists a unique market equilibrium. Furthermore, this equilibrium is symmetric.
The pricing rule (22) may be rewritten as
which shows that, for any given N , the equilibrium markupm(N ) varies inversely with the elasticity of substitution. The intuition is easy to grasp. We know from industrial organization that product dierentiation relaxes competition. When the elasticity of substitution is lower, varieties are poorer substitutes, thereby endowing rms with more market power. It is, therefore, no surprise that rms have a higher markup when σ is lower. It also follows from (23) that the way σ varies with x and N shapes the properties of market outcome. In particular, this demonstrates that assuming a constant elasticity of substitution amounts to adding very strong restraints on the way the market works.
Combining (20) and (22), the equilibrium operating prots earned by a rm when there are N rms are given byπ
It is legitimate to ask howπ(N ) varies with the mass of rms. There is no straightforward answer to this question. However, the expression (24) suces to show how the market outcome reacts to the entry of new rms depends on how the elasticity of substitution varies with x and N . This conrms why static comparative statics may yield ambiguous results in dierent set-ups.
We now pin down the equilibrium value of N by using the zero-prot condition. Therefore, a consumer's income is equal to her sole labor income: Y = y. A symmetric free-entry equilibrium (SFE) is described by the vector (q * , p * , x * , N * ), where N * solves the zero-prot
while q * =q(N * ), p * =p(N * ) and x * =x(N * ). The Walras Law implies that the budget constraint N * p * x * = y is satised. Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to the domain of parameters for which N * < Ly/F .
Combining (23) and (25), we obtain a single equilibrium condition given bȳ
When preferences are non-homothetic, (20) and (22) show that L/F and y enter the functionm(N ) as two distinct parameters. This implies that L and y have a dierent impact on the equilibrium markup, while a hike in L is equivalent to a drop in F . However, when preferences are homothetic, it is well known that the eects of L and y on the equilibrium are the same.
For (25) to have a unique solution N * for all values of F > 0, it is necessary and sucient thatπ(N ) strictly decreases with N . Dierentiating (24) with respect to N and using (20) and (25), we obtain
The second term on the right-hand side of this expression is positive i
Therefore,π(N ) strictly decreases with N for all L, y, c, and F i (27) holds. This implies the following proposition. Proposition 1. Assume (A). Then, there exists a free-entry equilibrium for all c > 0 and F > 0 i (27) holds for all x > 0 and N > 0. Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique, stable and symmetric.
Thus, we may safely conclude that the set of assumptions required to bring into play monopolistic competition must include (27) . This condition allows one to work with preferences that display a great deal of exibility. Indeed, σ may decrease or increase with x and/or N .
Evidently, (27) is satised when (16) holds. More generally, (17) and (27) dene a range of possibilities which is broader than the one dened by (16) . These conditions dene the striped area in Figure 1 , in which (16) is described by the fourth quadrant. Fig. 1 . The space of preferences Note that (27) amounts to E x (σ) < (σ −1)/σ for additive preferences, and to E x (σ) < σ −1 for indirectly additive preferences. Both conditions mean that σ cannot increase too fast with x. When preferences are homothetic, (27) holds i E N (σ) exceeds −1, which means that varieties cannot become too dierentiated when their number increases. All these inequalities will play a critical role in the comparative statics analysis performed below, which demonstrates their relevance (see Table 1 ).
Local conditions It is legitimate to ask what Proposition 1 becomes when (27) does not hold for all x > 0 and N > 0. In this case, several stable SFEs may exist, so that Propositions 2-4 discussed below hold true for small shocks at any stable SFE. Of course, when there is a multiplicity of equilibria, dierent patterns may arise at dierent equilibria because the functions E x (σ) and E N (σ) need not behave in the same way at each stable equilibrium.
Comparative statics
In this subsection, we study the impact of a shock in the GDP on the SFE. A higher total income may stem from a larger population L, a higher per capita income y, or both. Next, we discuss the role of productivity. To achieve our goal, it is convenient to use markup as the endogenous variable. Setting m ≡ F N/(Ly), we may rewrite the equilibrium condition (26) in terms of m only:
Note that (28) involves the four structural parameters of the economy: L, y, c and F . Furthermore, it is readily veried that the left-hand side of (28) increases with m i (27) holds. Therefore, to study the impact of a specic parameter, we only have to nd out how the corresponding curve is shifted. In our comparative static analysis, we will refrain from following an encyclopaedic approach in which all cases are systematically explored.
The impact of population size
Let us rst consider the impact of L on the market price p * . Dierentiating (28) with respect to L, we nd that the left-hand side of (28) is shifted upwards under an increase in L i (17) holds.
As a consequence, the equilibrium markup m * , whence the equilibrium price p * , decreases with L. This is in accordance with Handbury and Weinstein (2015) who observe that the price level for food products falls with city size. Second, the zero-prot condition implies that L always shifts p * and q * in opposite directions. Therefore, rm sizes are larger in bigger markets, as suggested by the empirical evidence provided by Manning (2010) .
How does N * change with L? Dierentiating (24) with respect to L, we obtain
Since the rst term in the right-hand side of this expression is positive, (29) is positive i the following condition holds:
In this case, a population growth triggers the entry of new rms. Otherwise, the mass of varieties falls with the population size. Indeed, when E x (σ) exceeds σ − 1, increasing the individual consumption makes varieties much closer substitutes, which intensies competition.
Under such circumstances, the benets associated with diversity are low, implying that consumers value more the volumes they consume. This in turn leads a certain number of rms going out of business. Furthermore, when the mass of rms increases with L, the labor market balance condition implies that N * rises less than proportionally because q * also increases with L. Observe also that (27) implies (30) when preferences are additive, while (30) holds true under homothetic preferences because E x (σ) = 0.
The following proposition comprises a summary.
Proposition 2. If E x (σ) is smaller than E N (σ) at the SFE, then a larger population results in a lower markup and larger rms. Furthermore, the mass of varieties increases with L i (30) holds in equilibrium.
What happens when E x (σ) > E N (σ) at the SFE? In this event, a larger population results in a higher markup, smaller rms, a more than proportional rise in the mass of varieties, and lower per-variety consumption. In other words, a larger market would generate anti-competitive eects, which do not seem very plausible.
The impact of individual income
We now come to the impact of the per capita income on the SFE. One expects a positive shock on y to trigger the entry of new rms because more labor is available for production. However, consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for the incumbent varieties and can aord to buy each of them in a larger volume. Therefore, the impact of y on the SFE is a priori ambiguous.
Dierentiating (28) with respect to y, we see that the left-hand side of (28) is shifted downwards by an increase in y i E N (σ) > 0. In this event, the equilibrium markup decreases with y. To check the impact of y on N * , we dierentiate (24) with respect to y and get after simplication:
Hence, ∂π(N * )/∂y > 0 i the following condition holds:
a condition more stringent than (30) . Thus, if E N (σ) > 0, then (31) implies (27) . As a consequence, we have: Proposition 3. If E N (σ) > 0 at the SFE, then higher per capita income results in a lower markup and bigger rms. Furthermore, the mass of varieties increases with y i (31) holds in equilibrium.
Thus, when entry renders varieties less dierentiated, the mass of varieties need not rise with income. This is because the decline in prices is too strong for more rms to operate at a larger scale.
The impact of rm productivity
Firm productivity (trade barriers) is typically measured by marginal costs (trade costs). To uncover the impact on the market outcome of a productivity shock common to all rms, we conduct a comparative static analysis of the SFE with respect to c and show that the nature of preferences determines the extent of the pass-through. The left-hand side of (28) is shifted downwards under a decrease in c i E x (σ) < 0 (32) holds. In this case, both the equilibrium markup m * and the equilibrium mass of rms N * = (yL/F ) · m * increases with c. In other words, when E x (σ) < 0, the pass-through is smaller than 100%. This is because varieties becomes more dierentiated, which relaxes competition.
It must be kept in mind that the price change occurs through the following three channels.
First, when facing a change in its own marginal cost, a rm changes its price more or less proportionally by balancing the impact of the cost change on its markup and market share.
Second, since all rms face the same cost change, they all change their prices, which aects the toughness of competition and, thereby, the prices set by the incumbents. Third, as rms change their pricing behavior, the number of rms in the market changes, changing the markup of the active rms. Under homothetic preferences, the markup remains the same regardless of the productivity shock, implying that the pass-through is 100%. Indeed, we have seen that the markup function m(·) depends only upon N , and thus (26) does not involve c as a parameter.
and totally dierentiating this expression yields
Since dm * and E x (σ) have opposite signs under a positive productivity shock, dq * and 1 + E N (σ) must have the same sign for (33) to hold. In other words, a drop in c leads to an increase in q * i E N (σ) > −1 holds.
Proposition 4. If rms face a drop in their marginal production cost, (i) the market price decreases, (ii) the markup and number of rms increase i E x (σ) < 0 holds in equilibrium, and (iii) rms are larger i E N (σ) > −1 in equilibrium.
This proposition has an important implication. If the data suggest a pass-through smaller than 100%, then it must be that E x (σ) < 0. In this case, (30) and (31) must hold, thereby a bigger or richer economy displays more diversity than a smaller or poorer one.
Remark. When E x (σ) > 0, the pass-through exceeds 100%, so that p * decreases more than proportionally with c. As noticed in 2.3.2, though rather uncommon, a pass-through larger than 100% cannot be ruled out a priori.
Summary
Let us pause and recall our main results. We have found a necessary and sucient condition for the existence and uniqueness of SFE (Proposition 1) and provided a complete characterization of the eect of market size or a productivity shock (Propositions 2 to 4). Given that (16) implies (27) , (17) and (31), we may conclude as follows: if (16) holds, a unique SFE exists (Proposition 1), a larger market or a higher income leads to lower markups, bigger rms and a larger number of varieties (Propositions 2 and 3), while the pass-through is incomplete (Proposition 4). However, Propositions 1-4 still hold under conditions more general than (16).
Although we consider general symmetric preferences, the market outcome is governed only by the behavior of the elasticity of substitution σ(x, N ) and by E x (σ) and E N (σ). Table 1 summarizes the main results of this section.
Shocks Variables
Increase in L Increase in y Decrease in c 
Hence, at a symmetric consumption pattern x i = x, homothetic preferences are separable in the total consumption X and the mass N of varieties. Preferences exhibit a love for variety i ψ(N ) increases with N .
The social optimum
The planner aims to solve the following optimization problem:
Using symmetry, the socially optimal outcome is given by the solution to
subject to (i) the labor balance condition
(ii) and the availability constraints:
It is reasonable to assume that X and N are substitutes. This is so i 1/ψ(N ) is convex.
It is readily veried that this condition is equivalent to the inequality:
The following result provides a characterization of the optimum (for the proof see Appendix 5 in the Supplemental Material).
Proposition 5. Assume consumers are variety-lovers while X and N are substitutes. Then, there exists a unique social optimum. Furthermore, the optimum involves a positive range of varieties i
Otherwise, the optimum is given by the corner solution
Observe that the optimum may involve the supply of a single variety even when consumers are variety-lovers. Indeed, the labor balance constraint may be rewritten as follows:
Therefore, the unique solution of the social planner's problem is the corner solution given by (38) i the slope F/(cL) exceeds the slope of the indierence curve at (0, 1/c) in the plane (N, X). Put dierently, the marginal rate of substitution between X and N is too small for more than one variety to be produced.
Is there over-or under-provision of diversity?
4.2.1 When do the equilibrium and optimum coincide under homothetic preferences?
The ratio of the rst-order conditions of (35) is given by
Using X ≡ xN , we may rewrite (39) as follows:
As for the market equilibrium condition (26) , it may be reformulated as follows:
Comparing (40) and (41) shows that the social optimum and the market equilibrium are
while it is readily veried that there is excess (insucient) variety i the right-hand side term of (42) is larger (smaller) than the left-hand side term.
Clearly, (42) is unlikely to be satised unless some strong restrictions are imposed on preferences. The general belief is that this condition holds only for the CES. Yet, we nd it natural to ask whether there are other homothetic preferences for which the SFE is optimal. In the next proposition, we show that there exists a mapping from the set of homothetic preferences into itself such that the SFE and the optimum coincide for an innite set of homothetic preferences, which includes the CES (see Appendix B for a proof ). However, as shown by Example 1, there are homothetic preferences that do not satisfy this property, even when markups are constant along the diagonal. Moreover, as shown by Example 1, there exist homothetic preferences that do not satisfy this property, even when markups are constant along the diagonal. As a consequence, working with a subset of homothetic preferences may generate versatile welfare properties, which means that care is needed when drawing policy recommendations based on models that use homothetic preferences and monopolistic competition.
Proposition 6. For any homothetic utility U (x), there exists an homothetic utility V (x) that is generically non-CES such that the market equilibrium and optimum coincide for the homothetic utility given by [U (x)V (x)] 1/2 . Example 1. The equivalence does not hold for all homothetic preferences, even when the markup is constant along the diagonal.
Consider the following class of generalized CES preferences:
where 0 < ρ < 1 is distributed according to the probability cumulative distribution H(ρ) over [0, 1] . When this distribution is degenerate, (43) is equivalent to the standard CES. The idea behind (43) is that consumers are unsure about the degree of dierentiation across varieties.
It is readily veried that the elasticity of substitutionσ(x, x) is now given bȳ (44) which is variable, implying that (43) is non-CES. Regardless of the shape of the distribution H(ρ), (43) describes a strictly convex symmetric preference over L 2 ([0, N] ).
6 Therefore, as above, it is legitimate to focus on symmetric outcomes.
the value of which depends on the distribution H. Hence, at any symmetric outcome, everything work as if preferences were CES with a constant elasticity of substitution given by (45).
Following the line of Appendix C, the SFE can be shown to be optimal i
Var(ρ) = 0.
This amounts to assuming that the distribution of ρ is degenerate. If not, the SFE is not
optimal.
While Example 1 shows that a constant elasticity of substitution is not a necessary condition for the optimality of the equilibrium, Proposition 6 relies on homotheticity, a property shared by the CES. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether homotheticity is a necessary condition for the SFE to be optimal. Example 2 below shows that it is not.
Example 2. The equivalence may hold for non-homothetic preferences displaying a variable markup. This is shown for the following class of non-homothetic preferences (see Appendix B):
where r ≡ Var(ρ)/E(ρ). Observe that the constant r is positive and smaller than 1 because ρ is distributed over the interval [0, 1] . When the distribution is degenerate, (46) boils down to the CES with the elasticity of substitution equal to 1/(1 − ρ).
To sum up, a constant markup is neither a necessary nor a sucient condition for the market equilibrium to be optimal.
Remark. Examples 3). We know that standard CES preferences imply that σ is constant everywhere, hence along the diagonal. Example 1 shows that there exist non-CES symmetric preferences for which σ is constant along the diagonal. Regarding now Example 2, (A.12) in Appendix C implies σ(x, N ) = r ln x + 1 r ln x + 1 − E(ρ) .
Therefore, even though (46) is neither homothetic nor additive, along the diagonal σ depends solely on x as in the case of additive preferences.
The optimal shifter
Another way to approach the diversity issue is to proceed along the line suggested by Dixit and Stiglitz who argued in their working paper that the mass of available varieties could enter the utility functional as a specic argument. Given φ(X, N ), it is reasonable to map this function into another homothetic preference A(N )φ(X, N ), where A(N ) is a shifter that depends on N only. Observe that the utility A(N )U (x) is homothetic and generates the same equilibrium outcome as U (x), for the elasticity of substitution σ(N ) is unaected by introducing the shifter A(N ). An example of shifter used in the literature is given by the augmented-CES:
In Benassy (1996) , ν is a positive constant that captures the consumer benet of a larger number of varieties. The idea is to separate the love-for-variety eect from the competition eect generated by the degree of product dierentiation, which is inversely measured by the elasticity of substitution σ. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) take the opposite stance by assuming σ in (47) to increase with N and setting ν = −1/[σ(N ) − 1]. Under this specication, increasing the number of varieties does not raise consumer welfare but intensies competition among rms.
To determine the shifter A(N ) that guarantees optimal product diversity, we observe that (42) is to be rewritten as follows in the case of A(N )φ(X, N ):
For this expression to hold, A(N ) must be the solution to the linear dierential equation in
which has a unique solution up to a positive constant. Therefore, there always exists a shifter replaced with A(N )U (x) . The shifter aligns the optimum to the equilibrium, which remains the same.
Furthermore, it is readily veried that there is excess (insucient) variety i the righthand side term of (48) In other words, by taking a power transformation of N ν φ(N, x), we can render the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the optimum arbitrarily large, or arbitrarily small, by changing the value of ν.
In sum, by choosing the appropriate shifter, the gap between the market equilibrium and the social optimum can be made equal to any arbitrary positive or negative constant.
Heterogeneous rms
It is natural to ask whether the approach developed in this paper can cope with Melitz-like heterogeneous rms. In this event, the consumption pattern ceases to be symmetric, making the problem innitely dimensional. Yet, all rms of a given type supply the same output. As shown below, making the elasticity of substitution type-specic allows us to use σ for studying heterogeneous rms at the cost of one only additional dimension, i.e. the rm's type.
In what follows, we build on Asplund and Nocke (2006), but use a one-period framework á la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . The mass of potential rms is given by N. Prior to entry, risk-neutral rms face uncertainty about their marginal cost while entry requires a sunk cost F e .
Once this cost is paid, rms observe their marginal cost drawn randomly from the continuous probability distribution Γ(c) dened over R + , with a density γ(c). After observing its type c, each entrant decides to produce or not, given that an active rm must incur a xed production cost F . Under such circumstances, the mass of entrants, N e , typically exceeds the mass of operating rms, N . Even though varieties are dierentiated from the consumer's point of view, rms sharing the same marginal cost c behave in the same way and earn the same prot at equilibrium. As a consequence, we may refer to any variety/rm by its c-type only.
The equilibrium conditions are as follows:
(i) the prot-maximization condition for c-type rms:
(ii) the zero-prot condition for the cuto rm:
whereĉ is the cuto cost. At equilibrium, rms are sorted out by decreasing order of productivity, which implies that the mass of active rms is equal to N ≡ N e Γ(ĉ);
(iii) the product market clearing condition:
(iv) the labor market clearing condition:
(v) rms enter the market until the expected prots net of the entry cost F e are zero:ĉ
Since the distribution Γ is given, the prot-maximization condition implies that the equilibrium consumption prole is entirely determined by the set of active rms, which is fully described byĉ and N e . In other words, a variety supplied by an active rm can be viewed as a point in the set
In the case of homogeneous rms, the variable N is sucient to describe the set of active rms, so that Ω = [0, N ].
It follows from (49) and the envelope theorem that rms with a higher productivity earn higher prots. so that there is perfect sorting across rm types at any equilibrium. The rstorder conditions for any c i and c j imply
Condition (A) of Section 2.2 implies that, for any given x, a rm's marginal revenue D(x, x) [1 −η(x, x)] decreases with x regardless of its marginal cost. Therefore, it follows from (50) that x i > x j i c i < c j . In other words, more ecient rms produce more than less ecient rms. Furthermore, since p i = D(x, x)/λ and D decreases in x for any given x, more ecient rms sell at lower prices than less ecient rms. For the markups, (50) yields
Consequently, more ecient rms enjoy higher markups as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) iη(x, x) increases with x, i.e., (AA) holds. Therefore, if (A) holds more ecient rms produce larger outputs and charge lower prices than less ecient rms. In addition, more ecient rms have higher markups i (AA) holds.
Very much as in 3.1 where N is treated parametrically, we assume for the moment that c and N e are given, and consider the game in which the corresponding active rms compete in quantities. Because we work with general preferences, the quantity game cannot be solved pointwise. Indeed, the prot-maximizing output of a c-type rm depends on what the other types of rms do. We show in Appendix 6 of the Supplemental Material that, for anyĉ and N e , an equilibriumx(c, N e ) of the quantity game exists. Observe that the counterpart ofx(ĉ, N e ) in the case of symmetric rms isx(N ) given by (20) . Furthermore, because all the c-type rms sell at the same price, which depends on c, the consumption of a variety is c-specic, which makes the consumption of the corresponding c-type varieties c-specic.
The operating prots of a c-type rm made at an equilibrium x * (c, N e ) of the quantity game are as follows:π
which is the counterpart ofπ(N ) in the case of heterogeneous rms. Note that the perfect sorting of rms implies thatπ c (ĉ, N e ) decreases with c.
A free-entry equilibrium with heterogeneous rms is dened by a pair (ĉ * , N * e ) which satises the zero-expected-prot condition for each rm:ĉ
and the cuto conditionπĉ (ĉ, N e ) = F.
Thus, regardless of the nature of preferences and the distribution of marginal costs, the heterogeneity of rms amounts to replacing the variable N by the two variablesĉ and N e because N = Γ(ĉ)N e whenx(N ) is replaced byx(ĉ, N e ). As a consequence, the complexity of the problem increases from one to two dimensions.
Dividing (51) by (52) yields the following new equilibrium condition:ĉ
5.1 Making the elasticity of substitution type-specic
When rms are symmetric, the sign of E N (σ) plays a critical role in comparative statics. Since rms of a given type are symmetric, the same holds here. The dierence is that the mass of active rms is now determined by the two endogenous variablesĉ and N e . As a consequence, understanding how the mass of active rms responds to a population hike requires studying the way the left-hand side of (53) varies withĉ and N e . Let σ c (ĉ, N e ) be the equilibrium value of the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties supplied by c-type rms:
In this case, we may rewriteπ c (ĉ, N e ) as follows:
which is the counterpart of (24) . Hence, by making σ type-specic, we are able to use the elasticity of substitution for studying heterogeneous rms at the cost of one additional dimension,
i.e. the rm's type c.
Using the envelope theorem and the prot-maximization condition (49), we obtain:
Combining this with (54) allows us to rewrite the equilibrium conditions (52) and (53) as follows:
(57) Letĉ = g(N e ) be the locus of solutions to (56) andĉ = h(N e ) the locus of solutions to (57).
7 A free-entry equilibrium (ĉ * , N * e ) is the intersection point of the two lociĉ = g(N e ) andĉ = h(N e ) in the (N e ,ĉ)-plane, and thus the properties of the equilibrium (ĉ * , N * e ) depend only upon the slopes of these two curves, which in turn are determined by the behavior of σ c (ĉ, N e ). In particular, if σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases withĉ, the left-hand side of (53) increases withĉ.
Intuitively, whenĉ increases, the mass of rms increases as less ecient rms stay in business, which intensies competition and lowers markups. In this case, the selection process is tougher.
This is not the end of the story, however. Indeed, the competitiveness of the market also depends on how N e aects the degree of dierentiation across varieties. 7 We give below a sucient condition for the left-hand side of (57) to be monotone inĉ when h is well dened.
Properties of the free-entry equilibrium
The elasticity of substitution being the keystone of our approach, it is legitimate to ask whether imposing some simple conditions on σ c (similar to those used in Section 3) can tell us something about the slope of g(N e ). The left-hand side of (57) increases with N e i σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases in N e . This amounts to assuming that, for any given cutoĉ, the relative impact of entry on the low-productivity rms (i.e., the small rms) is larger than the impact on the high-productivity rms. As implied by (55), E c (π c (ĉ, N e )) decreases in N e i σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases in N e . This leads us to impose an additional condition which implies that rms face a more competitive market when the number of active rms rises.
(B) The equilibrium prot of each rm's type decreases inĉ and N e .
The intuition behind this assumption is easy to grasp: a larger number of entrants or a higher cuto leads to lower prots, for the mass of active rms rises. When rms are symmetric, the equilibrium operating prots depend only upon the number N of active rms (see (24)). Thus, (B) amounts to assuming that these prots decrease with N . Using Zhelobodko et al.
(2012), it is readily veried that any additive preference satisfying (A) also satises (B).
As implied by (B), g(N e ) is downward-sloping in the (N e ,ĉ)-plane. Furthermore, it is shifted upward when L rises. As for h(N e ), it is independent of L but its slope is a priori undetermined. Three cases may arise. First, if the locus h(N e ) is upward-sloping, there exists a unique free-entry equilibrium, and this equilibrium is stable. Furthermore, both N * e andĉ * increase with L (see Figure 2a) . Second, under the CES preferences, h(N e ) is horizontal, which implies that N * e rises with L whileĉ * remains constant.
Fig. 2. Cuto and market size
Last, when h(N e ) is downward-sloping, two subcases must be distinguished. In the rst, h(N e ) is less steep than g(N e ). As a consequence, there still exists a unique free-entry equilibrium. This equilibrium is stable and such that N * e increases with L, butĉ * now decreases with L (see Figure 2b ). In the second subcase, h(N e ) is steeper than g(N e ), which implies that the equilibrium is unstable because h(N e ) intersects g(N e ) from below. In what follows, we focus only upon stable equilibria.
In sum, we end up with the following property: Proposition 7. Assume (B). Then, the equilibrium mass of entrants always increases with L.
When σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases both withĉ and N e , the locus h(N e ) is downward-sloping. Indeed, when N e rises, so does the left-hand side of (57). Hence, since σ c (ĉ, N e ) also increases withĉ, it must be thatĉ decreases for (57) to hold. As a consequence, we have: Proposition 8. Assume (B) . If σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases withĉ and N e , then the equilibrium cuto decreases with L. If σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases withĉ and decreases with N e , thenĉ * increases with L.
Givenĉ, we know that the number of active rms N is proportional to the number of entrants N e . Therefore, assuming that σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases with N e may be considered as the counterpart of (17), for (17) and σ(x(N ), N ) increasing in N can be shown to be equivalent. In this case, the pro-competitive eect generated by entry exacerbates the selection eect across rms. In response to a hike in L, the two eects combine to induce the exit of the least ecient active rms. This echoes Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who show that a trade liberalization shock gives rise to a similar eect under quadratic preferences. In the present set-up, the impact of population size on the number of entrants remains unambiguous. In contrast, the cuto cost behavior depends on how the elasticity of substitution σ c (ĉ, N e ) varies with N e .
In other words, even for plausible preferences generating pro-competitive eects, predictions regarding the direction of the rms' selection are inherently fragile.
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Note that what we said in Section 3.2 about local versus global conditions equally applies here. Indeed, when σ c (ĉ, N e ) increases withĉ and N e in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium, the above argument can be repeated to show that the equilibrium cuto decreases with L for small changes in L. Note also that the pass-through is still complete under homothetic preferences when rms are heterogeneous.
Heterogeneous rms or asymmetric preferences. The assumption of symmetric preferences puts a strong structure on substitution between variety pairs. Without aecting the nature of our results, this assumption can be relaxed to capture a more realistic substitution pattern. We have seen that varieties sharing the same marginal cost c may be viewed as symmetric, whereas varieties produced by c i -type and c j -type rms are asymmetric when c i and c j obey dierent substitution patterns. As a consequence, a model with heterogeneous rms supplying symmetric varieties is isomorphic to a model with symmetric rms selling varieties whose degree of dierentiation varies with their type c.
To illustrate, consider the case in which preferences are asymmetric in the following way: the utility functional U(x) is given by 8 Results are ambiguous when σ c (ĉ, N e ) decreases withĉ. In this case, the left-hand side of (57) may be non-monotone inĉ. As a result, the mapping h(N e ) may cease to be single-valued, which potentially leads to the existence of multiple equilibria. However, note that at any specic equilibrium, the behavior ofĉ with respect to L depends solely on whether h(N e ) is locally upward-sloping or downward-sloping.
whereŨ is a symmetric functional that satises (4), a is a weight function and a · x is dened pointwise by (a · x) i ≡ a i x i for all i ∈ [0, N]. The preferences (58) can be made symmetric by changing the units in which the quantities of varieties are measured. Indeed, for any i, j ∈ [0, N] the consumer is indierent between consuming a i /a j units of variety i and one unit of variety j. Therefore, by using the change of variablesx i ≡ a i x i andp i ≡ p i /a i , we can reformulate the consumer's program as follows:
In this case, by rescaling prices, quantities and costs by the weights a i , the model now involves symmetric preferences but heterogeneous rms. Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping between models with symmetric preferences and heterogeneous rms, and models with asymmetric preferences of type (58) and symmetric rms. In this case, the elasticity of substitution is a-specic and there exists a cut-o varietyâ such that market forces select only the varieties that have a weight exceedingâ.
6 Two-sector economy Consumers share the same preferences given by U (U(x), x 0 ) where the functional U (x) satises the properties stated in Section 2, while x 0 is the consumption of the homogeneous good. The upper-tier utility U is strictly quasi-concave, continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing in each argument, and such that the demand for the dierentiated product is always positive.
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Choosing the unit of the homogeneous good for the marginal productivity of labor to be equal to 1, the equilibrium price of the homogeneous good is equal to 1. Since prots are zero at the SFE, the budget constraint is given bŷ
where the expenditure E on the dierentiated good is endogenous because competition across rms aects the relative price of this good. 9 Our results hold true if the choke price is nite but suciently high.
Using the rst-order condition for utility maximization yields
Let p be the price of the dierentiated good. Along the diagonal x i = x, the above condition
where S is the marginal rate of substitution between the dierentiated and homogeneous goods:
The quasi-concavity of the upper-tier utility U implies that the marginal rate of substitution decreases with ϕ(x, N ) and increases with x 0 . Therefore, for any given (p, x, N ), (60) has a unique solutionx 0 (p, x, N ), which is the income-consumption curve. The two goods being normal, this curve is upward sloping in the plane (x, x 0 ).
For any given x i = x, the love for variety implies that the utility level increases with the number of varieties. However, it is reasonable to suppose that the marginal utility D of an additional variety decreases. To be precise, we assume that (C) for all x > 0, the marginal utility D weakly decreases with the number of varieties.
Observe that (C) holds for additive and quadratic preferences. Since ϕ(x, N ) increases in N , S decreases. As D weakly decreases in N , it must be that x 0 increases for the condition (60) to be satised. In other words,x 0 (p, x, N ) increases in N .
We are now equipped to determine the relationship between x and m by using the zeroprot condition when rms are symmetric. Since by denition m ≡ (p − c)/p, for any given p the zero-prot and product market clearing conditions yield the per-variety consumption as a function of m only:
Plugging ( 
The left-hand side mσ of (63) equals zero for m = 0 and exceeds 1 when m = 1. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, the set of SFEs is non-empty. Moreover, it has an inmum and a supremum, which are both SFEs because the left-hand side of (63) is continuous. In what follows, we denote the corresponding markups by m inf and m sup ; if the SFE is unique, m inf = m sup . Therefore, the left-hand side of (63) must increase with m in some neighborhood of m inf , for otherwise there would be an equilibrium to the left of m inf , a contradiction. Similarly, the left-hand side of (63) increases with m in some neighborhood of m sup . Since ∂N /∂y > 0, (63) implies that an increase in y shifts the locus mσ upward i E N (σ) > 0, so that the equilibrium markups m inf and m sup decrease in y. The same holds in response to a hike in population size.
Summarizing our results, we come to a proposition. Proposition 9. Assume (C). Then, the set of SFEs is non-empty. Furthermore, (i) an increase in individual income leads to a lower markup and bigger rms at the inmum and supremum SFEs i E N (σ) > 0 and (ii) an increase in population size yields a lower markup and bigger rms at the inmum and supremum SFEs if E x (σ) < 0 and E N (σ) > 0.
This extends to a two-sector economy what Propositions 2 and 3 state in the case of a onesector economy. Proposition 9 also shows that the elasticity of substitution keeps its relevance for studying monopolistic competition in a multisector economy. In contrast, studying how N * changes with L or y is a harder problem because the equilibrium number of varieties depends on the elasticity of substitution between the dierentiated and homogeneous goods.
Concluding remarks
We have shown that monopolistic competition can be considered as the marriage between oligopoly theory and the negligibility hypothesis, thus conrming Mas-Colell's (1984) intuition.
Using the concept of elasticity of substitution, we have provided a complete characterization of the market outcome and its comparative statics in terms of prices, rm size, and mass of rms/varieties. Somewhat ironically, the concept of elasticity of substitution, which has vastly contributed to the success of the CES model of monopolistic competition, is relevant in the case of general preferences, both for symmetric and heterogeneous rms. The fundamental dierence is that the elasticity of substitution ceases to be constant and now varies with the key-variables of the setting under study. We take leverage on this to make predictions about the impact of market size and productivity shocks on the market outcome.
Furthermore, we have singled out our most preferred set of assumptions and given disarmingly simple necessary and sucient conditions for the standard comparative statics eects to hold true. We have also shown that relaxing these assumptions does not jeopardize the tractability of the model. Future empirical studies should shed light on the plausibility of the assumptions discussed in this paper by checking their respective implications. It would be unreasonable, however, to expect a single set of conditions to be universally valid.
Last, although monopolistic competition is unable to replicate the rich array of ndings obtained in industrial organization, it is our contention that models such as those presented in this paper avoid several of the limitations imposed by the partial equilibrium analyses of oligopoly theory. Although we acknowledge that monopolistic competition is the limit of oligopolistic equilibria, we want to stress that monopolistic competition may be used in dierent settings as a substitute for oligopoly models when these appear to be unworkable.
(ii) We show that U 1/2 V 1/2 is generically described by non-CES preferences Following the line of Appendix B and using (46), the elasticity of substitutionσ(x, x) between varieties i and j when x i = x j = x is given bȳ σ(x, x) = Combining (A.12) with the SFE conditions (18) , (23) and (25), we nd that the equilibrium individual consumption level must solve E [ u (x; ρ) (1 − r u (x; ρ))] E [ u (x; ρ)] = cLx cLx + F .
(A.13)
As for the optimality condition, it is readily veried to be E [ u (x; ρ)] = cLx cLx + F .
(A.14)
Computing u (x; ρ) and r u (x; ρ) and setting r ≡ Var(ρ)/E(ρ), the left-hand sides of (A. 13) and (A.14) imply
Therefore, the equilibrium condition (A.13) coincides with the optimality condition (A.14).
Q.E.D.
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